Update: Naxalites say 'no' to flowers

The Naxalites have dropped all pretenses in the killing of local adhivasis in Midnapur. Whereas last week the Naxalites at least denied a triple murder, blaming it on the CPM, this week the Naxalites have outright claimed responsibility. This, coupled with the revelation of a new anti-Naxalite adhivasi group, is a positive development.

Interestingly local Naxalite leader Bikash, who last week held a rally in Lalgarh and told the villagers "not to be scared" of the Maoists, claimed responsibility for killing two more people today. In one killing, he claimed that the individual was a member of the People's Committee Against Terror (apparently formed to counter the Naxalite-backed People's Committee Against Police Atrocities).

While this claim was not further explored by the Telegraph, it did note that Manik also sold puffed rice at police camps, became friends with a jawan from the police, and even gave a daughter in marriage. The Naxalites almost certainly knew this. Bikash claimed the other murdered was a "police informer."

The establishment of the Committee Against Terror is an encouraging sign, it would be even more encouraging if it was setup without any government backing or support. Regardless, the West Bengal government should support the movement. With the Naxalites continuing their wanton violence against the locals the West Bengal government simply needs to keep their own security forces in check.

If the West Bengal government can simultaenously eliminate "police atrocities" and prevent local CPM leaders from taking retribution against villagers, than the Naxalites will at least be kept out of the villages.

Flowers in the barrel of the gun perhaps?

The stalemate remains in southwestern Bengal, but two recent events have highlighted the importance of popular support. The first is the West Bengal government's admittance that its police forces have sacrificed popular support during Phase 2 of Operation Lalgarh. In the second, the Naxalites may have created a division that may cost them manpower and more importantly, public support (at least in the short term). The CPM and security forces must take advantage of the Naxalites misstep swiftly and without the "terror" that usually accompanies their liberation.

In addition to lacking a viable police informer network, West Bengal has blamed the police forces themselves for the failure of Phase 2. The government has admitted that after security forces reclaim an area from the Naxalites, returning CPM "informers" would point out households that sheltered the Naxalites. Police forces then "unleashed terror" on the villagers. It is little surprise that when the tide turned, these same villagers pointed out the CPM "informers" to the Naxalites (The Telegraph).

The police forces' actions led to the formation of the People's Committee Against Police Atrocities, which is meant to represent the tribal communities grievances against the police forces but also happens to be supported by the Naxalites.

Claims that the Naxalites were liberating the tribal communities from CPM oppression has been cast into doubt with the murder of three 'young tribals' belonging to the Jharkand Party (Naren) at Magura village in Binpur, Midnapur. Evidently the JKP(N) is quite popular as the local Member of the Legislative Assembly, Chunibala Hansda, is also from the party. The JKP(N) stated that the three were not prominent members or police informers, just party cadres. Hansda also noted that party workers were preparing to flee the area en masse (The Telegraph).

Realizing their mistake the Naxalites issued a press release stating that they hadn't committed murder. It was the CPM, naturally (The Telegraph). Barring some very surprising evidence, this press release is probably false.

Despite the denial, the Naxalites probably thought they had identified an opportunity prior to the slaying. That opportunity lies in the aftermath of a CPM informer killing, namely, political domination. The general sequence of events is: Naxalites kill CPM leaders/police informers, people and party members flee and are displaced, people and party members remain reluctant to move back, Naxalites take over.

Where the Naxalites miscalculated was in their assumption that all political parties were equal in the eyes of the tribal communities. They won't make that mistake again.

Quicknote: Guns vs. Cash

The Communist Party of India (Marxist, CPM) has caught on to one reason why the Naxalites have been able to gain repeated footholds in the southwest of West Bengal. Lack of economic development.

Earlier this week the CPM announced that it would be expanding the annual budgets of the three Naxalite affected districts of West Midnapur, Puruliya, and Bankura. The plan is to raise the budget from Rs. 22 crore to Rs. 235 crore, with increases in social programs as primary education, healthcare and irrigation (The Telegraph).

One hopes that the government will also attempt to tackle the issue of local corruption, lack of efficient governance, and poor integration of the hinterlands into the Kolkata hub. Additional distribution of monies from the central government to the provincial government, further increasing rural spending would also be welcome.

Alternatively, the provincial and central governments could also take a lesson from Pakistan. Arm the locals and unleash them against the Naxalites (Huffington Post).

Naxalites returneth

Despite the successes of the security forces earlier this month in driving out the overt presence of the Naxalites from Lalgarh, the Naxalites have continued to harass security forces as well as representatives of West Bengal's ruling Communist Party (Marxist). It would seem that the Naxalites are not quit ready to give up Lalgarh as their first "liberated zone."

In Goaltore, northeast of Lalgarh, a CPM leader was taken from his home and shot in a market place. In another incident, a CPM branch committee member in Salboni was abducted by Naxalites (The Telegraph). The Naxalites have also targeted police personnel in and around Lalgarh. At least three police personnel are missing (The Telegraph).

A police report (reported in the Telegraph) speculated that the Naxalites were targeting CPM leaders and supporters in order to prevent the revival of the area's "intelligence network." The report noted that after the Maoists established the "liberated zone," the police's intelligence network, which was based on information from the CPM, and its supporters "totally collapsed."

For their part, the Naxalites confirmed this report. One leader noted that the killings targeted people "who had been passing information about us to the police." While another noted that the group had learned from its past mistakes; after recruiting from the villages, the new recruits would be reported by the CPM informants, thus the kilings were a way of protecting their new manpower.

The CPM is going to be having an increasingly more difficult time in convincing its supporters and leaders to return to the area. However without their information network, security offensives against the Naxalites will become costly and probably achieve very little.

That the Naxalites are still able to recruit out of the area should be a warning sign to the West Bengal government. Although equitable development cannot be totally ensured until the security situation improves, it is necessary for the CPM and local administrators to prove to the local populace that they do have their best interests at heart.

The security forces will need to identify a new way of collecting the information they require, hopefully without further demoralizing the local people and the CPM. Cultivating new informants, independent of the ruling CPM, would be the easiest and quickest route. Moreover, the employment of the Cobras in Jharkand (the Telegraph) should keep the Naxalites off balance, for the time being.

Push Against Naxalites Continue

West Bengal police and Central Reserve Police Force paramilitaries, including some special force paramilitaries, are continuing their push against the Maoists (Naxalites). According to IBN, the Maoists are active in 21 police stations (thanas) in three districts, West Midnapore, Bankura, and Puruliya (see map).

According to the Telegraph, the Government began moving on Lalgarh last week traversing the Jhitka jungles from Binpur. From Saturday, 27 June, Government forces departed Goaltore and moved on Ramgarh, according to IBN. Allegedly, the Naxalites retreated 5 km. to Kanthapahari village.

This village is part of the plan for the final assault, according to the Telegraph (article 1 and article 2). The plan is for the government to move into the area of Khasjangal (about 8km from Lalgarh and 1.5 km from Ramgarh) and 'trap the Maoists so they can't escape to Bankura using the forest cover.'

(The image above is a notional example of the events preceding and a conceptulization of the final assault. Note the heavily wooded area between Ramgarh and Lalgarh.)

A Central Reserve Police Force officer noted the importance of the topography (probably the forested area) saying that the Naxalites are 'capable of inflicting heavy casualties before beating a tactical retreat.' In order to get a better idea of the terrain the Government has been seeking the aid of Ramgarh residents in drawing up maps of some of the villages in the area, Bankishole, Hathigonsa, Kanthapahari, Chhotopelia, and Barapelia.

Sadly, a resident of another village in the area noted that the Naxalites were preparing to use villagers as human shields.

As the CRPF officer noted the Naxalites 'have a strong base among the tribals and we are also sure to encounter human shieds.' One hopes that the Government will not hold the tribals loyalties against them when they push out the Naxalities.

It has been noted from a variety of sources that the Naxalites were able to gain a foothold and the confidence of the local residents because of the inability of the government (central, provincial or local) to provide the necessary benefits - education, healthcare, economic.

The use of human shields is very troubling. If the CRPF and other government personnel lose sight of the fact that they are there to help the local residents then they will only be breeding more resentment.

The articles mention that the troops will be taking along mortars, these are dangerous indirect fire weapons that discriminate even less than a bullet. They should be used sparingly, if at all, and only when absolutely necessary. The government cannot allow innocent locals who are being used as shields against their will to perish during their "liberation."

If the government is truly attempting to beat the threat that PM Singh has labelled the gravest threat to India's stability then they must minimize local casualties and finally make good on the promise of development and good governance.

Only then will the Naxalties be truly beaten.

Maoist on the wane, development, governance to rise?

The first line of Calcutta’s Telegraph says it all “Bullets cannot isolate Maoists, bowls of rice can.”

As reported, West Midnapore administrators are developing a short-term relief and rehabilitation program for the area. Besides distributing rice aid, the administrators will have to revive the local panchayats and involve them in the relief program.

The article also notes additional challenges in income generation and the re-enumeration of individuals below the poverty line. Though government records show 30,000 people (of 150,000) below the poverty line, an official said this was ‘a gross underestimation.’

In order to promote the development of the region, the block government is attempting to procure sewing machines for the adhivasi community and axes for the Lodha woodcutter community. Finally, Telegraph noted that only 3 primary health centers and a number of primary schools exist.

The Telegraph is on point with this article and another, “Rise and rot of a rebel ‘state."

Communities will naturally be more responsive to the group that is perceived to be providing direct, meaningful benefits to the area, whether it is the government or not. Now that the government has begun to push out the Naxalites, it must ensure that development continues to occur in the area. However it would be a mistake to focus all attention on Lalgarh, other communities in West Bengal’s rural areas should also enjoy rural development programs.

Aside from social and economic development, good governance is also necessary in these areas. Reviving the panchayats will go a long way, particularly since they will be involved and co-opted into the relief programs. However, corruption will remain a factor.

In northern West Bengal, in Malda district, the Telegraph also reported that an adhivasi community is demanding the removal of the inspector-in-charge of Habibur police station alleging that police were bribed not to investigate, nor charge anyone in the gang raping of a 12-year old. Her father lodged a First Information Report after his daughter named her attackers.

If corruption can be reined in, development could have a chance of actually impacting the local community. If it is not, then not only will the money be wasted, but the development will not occur (or it will occur in a lopsided way).

Such an outcome will enable another violent group to entrench itself in the rural areas – where good governance and prosperity, simply haven’t arrived.