Quicknote: Sidelining Reform, "Revolutionary" Elites Persist... for now

There is a notion, useful to the discussion of a country's early political history, that goes: the "revolutionary" leaders who led a country to independence are often themselves subject to a revolution. To put it simply, the revolutionary leaders are cast out.

It is not time for Bangladesh to undergo such a transition, though it seems to be coming. Late last week, the ruling Awami League held a national council the outcome of which saw five "reformists" dropped (New Nation). "Reformist" members of the BNP are still with the party, though they are concerned with their political futures considering what happened to their political adversaries (New Nation). At any rate, the BNP-reformers still have time to mull their position and decide a course of action, since the BNP national council probably won't occur before December 2009 (New Nation).

Friendly MPs from smaller parties have "exchanged pleasantries" with the recently sidelined Awami MPs and there are murmurs, regarding both groups, of floating new political parties. For their part, the reformers themselves have wisely not spoken directly on the subject as it is still much to early to discuss the establishment of two completely new political parties.

How does one best differentiate from two personality-driven political parties? That is fairly easy, discuss issues of concern and crush the culture of corruption and nepotism. The "reformers" are labelled as such because they were not adverse to the so-called "minus-two formula." This idea sought to remove both former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia from politics altogether, and for a time (while they were both under house arrest on charges of corruption) it almost came to pass.

However, Bangladesh's return to parlimentary democracy is still too recent. When politics revert back to "normal:" the Opposition calling frequent hartals and refusing to take part in the Jatiya Sangsad, rampant killings of each other's supporters, and the co-opting of the groups like the Sarbaharas and militant Islamists - then perhaps the Bangladeshi electorate will decide that "enough is enough." For at this time, the old political parties will demonstrate that they really didn't learn anything from their two years exile from Parliament.

And at that point, the familial history of both venerable begums will not save their political careers.

But what if politics is corruption?

Isabel Guerrero, World Bank Vice President for South Asian Affairs, is visiting Bangladesh and has met with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Finance Minister AMA Muhith. On the issue of corruption we are only offered the statement: "government wants to establish a corruption-free, democratic society." But how? Without any clear plan, PM Hasina's words are nothing more than sugar for Ms. Guerrero's tea.

In stark contrast to this, PM Hasina matches her objectives to clear plans and programs. Rural healthcare needs are being met with the reactivation of community clinics. Higher educational attainment through free primary and secondary (presumably) education. Poverty reduction through multi-lateral regional cooperation with other SAARC (South Asian Assciation for Regional Cooperation) members.

Her only remark on the subject of corruption was 'we will not turn the anti-corruption drive into anti-politics drive like the previous government.' A barely veiled reference to her detention during the Caretaker Government (note that Zia and Nizami, BNP and Jamaat supremos, were also detained) (New Nation).

Given the current global economic climate, it is unsurprising that the World Bank is unwilling to provide funding for road development due to corruption. Like PM Hasina, Minister Muhith is ignoring the issue by simply denying the World Bank's impression that "provisions have been made to award deals to ruling party loyals" (Daily Star).

The Awami government must get serious with fighting corruption, not only will this allow the government to secure promised funding from the World Bank, it will also lead to additional aid once donors recover. Reducing corruption would reduce the costs and improve the impact of PM Hasina's various programs.

The World Bank should continue to withhold non-critical funding until corruption is reined in. The Bangladeshi government should make a concerted attempt to deal quickly with cases of corruption, sparing none regardless of position or "party loyalty." Preventing corruption will generate a number of benefits not only for the exchequer but local residents and politicians. Without corruption, politicians will find that their constituents will require their thoughtful attention. Constituents will realize that only respectable, "clean" politicians will bring PM Hasina's programs to their districts.

Inspired to Jihad, Joining the Offshoot?

Information derived from suspected militants over the last couple of months has presented a clearer picture of the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and its offshoots, the Islam O Muslim and the new Jamaat-e-Muslimeen (JM). More importantly, new information has shown that the JMB and JM recruit at mosques under the banner of Dawat-e-Islam (DI). However, there is a legal question facing the Bangladesh, do DI's recruiting and advocacy activities at mosques constitute a criminal offense?

The above graphic (constructed with Compendium) illustrates the current picture of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh as Bangla Nation understands it, based solely on New Nation and Daily Star reports since January 2009.

Zahidul Islam ("Boma Mizan") arrested explosives expert of the JMB disclosed the existence of the JM and its current 'dawati' (invitational) activities taking place in Dhaka. 'Many JMB members we have arrested in recent times told us that they were members of Dawat-e-Islam and were first inspired in jehadi spirit through its activities. They later joined JMB,' according to a security official (Daily Star).

In April, seven members of the DI were arrested in Patharghata, Chittagong (possibly in Kotwali thana/police station) (Daily Star). However, this weekend's article noted that the seven members were acquitted by a Chittagong court because the police failed to prove their "involvement in militant activities." However, a Rapid Action Battalion (Rab) official asserted that "Jamaat-e-Muslimeen and Bangladesh-based Dawat-e-Islam are the same organization."

This is probably a bit too simplistc. While it seems there is little doubt that DI engaged in activities on behalf of JMB and possibly JM, it is unknown whether the JM and DI are the same organization. For one, the DI operates in over 70 countries, including Pakistan (hence the qualifier - Bangladesh-based). Jamaat-e-Muslimeen, on the other hand, has been billed as an offshoot of the JMB (like the Islam O Muslim organization).

The Chittagong Court made the right decision on acquitting the seven members of DI. After all, there was no evidence to suggest that they were themselves militants. This acquittal is a Bangladeshi victory for rule of law and the U.S., UK (and organizations like the HRW) should recognize it as such.

It is ironic that the rule of law saved those seven detainees. Hopefully, they will reflect on this and compare it to the countless videos of beheadings and abductions of individuals under the pretext of "justice."

Dropping the Ball.

Human Rights Watch often makes a big deal of the authoritarian tendencies of South Asian democracies. In "Ignoring Executions and Torture" (subtitled: Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces), a 76-page report published in May 2009, the watchdog makes only a passing reference to the BDR mutiny three months before.

"However, there is credible evidence that several members of the country’s border security force, the Bangladesh Rifles, were tortured to death by the army following their detention as suspects in an apparent mutiny that took place in February 2009 and left more than 70 people dead."

Ignoring the jibe at the Bangladeshi government ("an apparent mutiny"). The Human Rights Watch has been uncharacteristically silent on the subject of these tortures, as over this weekend the 35th death of a BDR jawan was recorded.

However, the context presented by the Daily Star contains two notable items: 1.) the deceased was not accused in the mutiny case and 2.) his colleague noted that the jawan was complaining of chest pains that morning. In this instance, torture on the part of the army is probably not the cause.

An earlier death did sound a bit strange, another "chest pain" victim was said to have bore "several red marks." However, the article did not explicitly state that the Army was involved. The article also indicated, up to that point, four jawans had committed suicide, seven died of heart attacks, and nine of "other diseases" (Daily Star).

Yet the HRW has not issued a statement since May 2009. It may be that the organization is faced with a dilemma. The narrative of an authoritarian state's organs working in concert to oppress the common people breaks down somewhat when it is not oppressing its people - but its own security services.

Whatever the case, the deaths of each jawan needs to be investigated, particularly those that perished under mysterious circumstances.

Moreover, the Bangladesh Rifles should be reformed. The Army should no longer provide officers for the organization, pay should be improved to the greatest extent possible (perhaps with a redistribution of funding following the demobilization of the Army brigade that was recently recalled from the CHT), and the link between the BDR and the Ministry of Home Affairs should be strengthened.

Finally, a perspective shift needs to occur. The BDR, as the BBC points out, has never mutinied. The Army cannot claim to be such a stalwart back of democracy. General Ziaur Rahman (husband of current Opposition leader Khaleda Zia, BNP) and General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (MP, Jatiya Party) both attained the Presidency of Bangladesh through a military coup. Finally, the Caretaker Government, in power from 2007 to Dec 2008, had the backing of General Moeen U Ahmed, who retired in mid-June 2009 (New Nation).

Bangladesh, the U.S., UK, and Australia should support the reformation of the Bangladesh Rifles and they should ensure that the jawans are treated with the respect, dignity, and honor deserving of Bangladesh's "first line of defense."

Exposing a Network

It seems that Islamist activism may be similar to the anatomy of a riot. Very generally (and definitely with ommission of finer points), there seems to be a nexus between the youths who compose the rank-and-file membership of the movement and the overall leadership. The nexus seems to be a teacher, and not necessarily at a madrassa, similar to the "riot leaders" who always seem to be around when things start to get bad.

However, whether the neutralization of the teacher will prevent the spread of the network has not been properly explored.

Kalimaya-e-Jamaat, hitherto unknown (for me anyway), is led by Abdul Majid of the Char Fashion Government College in Bhola, Barisal (I assume this is the same Charfasson sub-district annontated on the map). Six of his "disciplies" were arrested in Feni district Chittagong, they ranged in age from 18 to 26, and one, Samsuddin, completed his Master's degree at a government college.

Majid, who also has a Master's degree, was charge-sheeted in the 17 August 2005 bombings but is out on bail. He claims to have over 400 other activists but none are involved in anything "illegal" (Daily Star).

These arrests cast further doubt on the idea that Islamism is only attractive to those with poor educational attainment. Of note, Abdul Majid is not a teacher at a madrassa, he is employed at a government college. Additionally, unlike "Boma Mizan" of the JMB who had fairly high status, it doesn't appeart that Samsuddin (who attained a Master's) was nothing more than a cadre.

This reality should force many people in the Bangladeshi government (not to mention India, the U.S., and UK) to pause and study the implications. For one, it means that the message is not simply about duping uneducated masses. Regardless of the type of adherents, this reality does not legitimize the Islamist message and nor should governments treat the Islamist message as reasonable.

While there are aspects of Bangladesh politics and governance that could be substantial reformed the removal of the system is not the answer. Moreover, as the JMB saga illustrated, some Islamist outfits seek only to empower themselves and their cadre. What should happen is governmental reform taking into account the valid grievances of those who believe in the Islamist message.

Finally, these immediate arrests should be studied over the long term. Would the arrest of Abdul Majid effectively silence the Kalimaya-e-Jamaat? The JMB survived the deaths of many of their leaders (in particular Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam) but would it have if the mouth-pieces, prostylitizers, and preachers were also arrested?

However, this avenue should be approached cautiously. There is a fine line between freedom of speech and speech inciting violence.